Unlike in Egypt, "the army" is not a coherent institution. Qaddafi took care to politicize the military and divide its commanders in order to prevent a coup or other challenges to his rule. Moreover, the army was involved in interventions, such as a disastrous war in Chad, that tarnished its credibility—its battlefield record is not a source of pride. So the military is less able to lead the country out of the mess.My suspicion right now is we're looking at a Romania-type scenario in Libya - Qaddafi is gone (in my view he'll probably get the Ceauşescu treatment), but all the old stalwarts of the regime are still in power. That's the game I see them playing with all of these resignations - people like the ex-Interior Minister can claim to have been opposed to Qaddafi all along and introduce a kind of pseudo-democratic one-party rule. But who knows at this stage - almost anything could happen.
Nor is there a bureaucratic structure that can simply resume basic government functions under new leaders. Qaddafi created one of the world's most bizarre governments, with "people's committees" playing important roles at the local level. Indeed, Qaddafi himself did not hold a government position in any formal sense, even though he was clearly recognized as "the leader." This personalized and politicized system is part of what Libyans hate; it should not survive its creator. But removing Qaddafi's regime demands more than just change at the top.
Thursday, 24 February 2011
Libya after Qaddafi
Slate does a pretty good job of laying out the challenges in a post-Qaddafi Libya (if we ever get there - which is no sure thing).
Labels:
Egypt,
Libya,
Qaddafi,
Regime change
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